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Attracting and embedding R&D by multinational firms: policy recommendations for EU 
new member states 
 
Rajneesh Narula 
 
 
Abstract: This paper asks: what can governments of new member states do to encourage MNEs 
to invest in R&D?  There are two types of MNE R&D.  Innovation can be undertaken in order to 
adapt its existing products and services to local stimuli. This is ‘demand-driven R&D’.  
Innovation can also be in stand-alone R&D facilities which are considerably more knowledge-
intensive, and imply a considerably greater dependence on domestic knowledge sources and 
infrastructure. This is ‘supply-side R&D’. These two types of R&D require somewhat different 
approaches, and necessarily imply different policy options.  In this paper, furthermore, we focus 
on the MNE and the potential for linkages, and do not limit ourselves to FDI and spillovers. 
MNEs engage in a variety of other informal and non-equity agreements to engage in knowledge 
exchange.  We also deliberately consider the scope and competence at the MNE subsidiary level.  
These two novelties are useful in helping highlight the point that the tendency to focus on FDI 
flows is flawed, since knowledge exchanges and innovation are establishment level phenomena. 
An MNE policy is required which must link FDI policy and industrial policy in tandem.  This 
paper argues that it is most practical to recommend that new member states focus on attracting 
and fostering demand-driven R&D activities by MNEs. Furthermore, we recommend that 
governments reduce the emphasis on costs while increasing the emphasis on specialised location-
bound knowledge assets, and setting up programmes that foster demand-oriented upgrading of 
public R&D and human capital. 
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Attracting and embedding R&D by multinational firms: policy recommendations for EU 
new member states 
 
Introduction 
EU integration and expansion is a complex, cooperative socio-economic undertaking. At the 
most basic level, it requires new waves of members to evolve their political, economic and 
sociological milieu to converge upon the core member countries. With each new wave of 
membership, the diversity of members means that multiple groups of countries at different stages 
exist within the EU which each have different GDP levels, resource endowments, comparative 
advantages and industrial and economic structures.  Such diversity also implies different growth 
trajectories.   
It is also increasingly obvious that continual EU expansion means that it is not possible to have a 
common set of industrial and technological policies that can be applied across the board to 
promote growth, or even a single set of targets. In this paper we take the view that it is better 
instead to view EU countries as consisting of a tangible groups which share certain key features, 
and which can realistically be the basis for common policy recommendations. We contrast the 
‘core EU countries’ with the ‘non-core’ countries, which in turn can be split into 3 groups: The 
first group can be referred to as the cohesion countries, consisting of Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland. These countries have been long-standing members of the EU, and have market 
economies.  They are referred to here as the cohesion countries.  The NMS can be divided into 
two sub-groups. The first consist of Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and 
Poland, which have proceeded the furthest from the centrally planned economic structure, and 
furthest towards convergence. They are referred to here as the Advanced NMS. The second sub-
group are Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania which are still somewhat in transition. They 
are referred to here as the New NMS1. 
This paper will focus on the promotion of innovation activities by MNEs. This requires a 
somewhat different approach than promoting general value adding activities by MNEs. Two 
decades ago, MNE operations tended to be miniature replicas of the home country operations 
with most or all aspects of the value chain being undertaken in each host country. This is now 
only the case in very few investment projects, reflecting important changes in the global 
economic milieu associated with increasing interdependencies between countries, industries and 
                                                 
1
 Malta and Cyprus are excluded from this analysis.  
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firms.  MNEs are progressively distributing their activities across regions and countries to most 
efficiently exploit the technological capabilities of locations that best suits specific aspects of the 
activities. MNEs also increasingly fragment their innovative activities in different locations to 
best exploit specific aspects of particular systems. In certain cases these may be demand oriented 
– such as the presence of a large market or the availability of generic price-sensitive inputs. 
These are the centrifugal factors which promote the establishment of production and other value 
adding activities where MNEs attempt to exploit their existing assets and competences in 
conjunction with locally sourced inputs. In such cases, innovation activities are a case of ‘R&D 
in response to demand conditions’ where innovation is undertaken in order to adapt their 
existing products and services to local stimuli. Such R&D facilities tend to be relatively low 
knowledge-intensive, and remain somewhat footloose, requiring greater integration with the 
parent firm than with local knowledge infrastructure. It requires the MNE’s market-seeking FDI 
activities to integrate forward into R&D We refer to this as ‘demand-driven R&D’.  
In other circumstances MNEs are situated (or seek to establish themselves) in particular 
locations especially (and in some cases only) to undertake innovation because of specific 
location-bound assets, which may or may not include quasi-public goods provided through 
universities and public research institutes. Such innovation activities are stand-alone R&D 
facilities which are considerably more knowledge-intensive than the demand-driven R&D, and 
imply a considerably greater dependence on domestic knowledge sources and infrastructure. We 
refer to this as ‘supply-side R&D’. 
These two types of R&D require somewhat different approaches, and necessarily imply 
different policy options. Such technology and industrial policies are inextricably linked with the 
outcomes of FDI policies.  The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses and 
develops the innovation systems framework as a basis for understanding the interaction effects 
between technological capabilities, quasi-public goods by governments. The next section 
explains the complexities of globalization and extends the innovation systems approach to allow 
for cross-border influences, relationships and the interlocking nature of FDI, industrial and 
innovation policies. The last section provides policy suggestions for NMS governments to link 
FDI and innovation policies.  
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Innovation systems as a basis for analysing policy options 
This paper begins from the premise that all economic actors expand their activities depending 
upon the strength (or weakness) of their competitive assets.  These are not only confined to 
technological assets in the sense of ownership of plant, equipment and technical knowledge 
embodied in their engineers and scientists.  Economic units of all sizes also possess competitive 
advantages that derive from (a) the ability (i.e., knowledge) to create efficient internal hierarchies 
(or internal markets)) within the boundaries of the firm and (b) from being able to efficiently 
utilise external markets.  
Economic actors refer to organisations that are engaged in the regular production of 
outputs (whether a physical good or a service) for the purposes of meeting a specific or general 
demand. By economic actors we refer to two groups. The first group are firms – private and 
public – engaged in innovatory activity. Although they may not always be organised with the 
primary intention of generating economic rents (as is the case for state-owned firms), ongoing 
activities are evaluated on the basis of achieving their owner-defined output criteria. The second 
consists of non-firms that determine the knowledge infrastructure that supplements and supports 
firm-specific innovation, whose objective may be to make available their outputs as a semi-
public good. Economic actors are distinguishable from political and social actors. These political 
and social actors do not generate innovative outputs per se, but whose actions and activities 
shape the nature of the activities of the economic actors. 
While innovation may take place at a firm-level, Firms exist as part of ‘systems’. They 
are embedded through historical, social and economic ties to other economic and non-economic 
actors. Thus, in order to understand innovation (or the lack thereof) from a policy perspective we 
need to understand the systemic interactions, relationships and routines of organisations of all the 
complex interactions between a firm and its environment. The environment consists firstly of 
interactions between firms—especially between a firm and its network of customers and 
suppliers. Secondly, the environment involves broader factors shaping the behaviour of firms: 
the social and perhaps cultural context; the institutional and organisational framework; 
infrastructures; the processes which create and distribute scientific knowledge, and so on. 
*** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 Figure 1 gives a stylised version of a ‘conventional’ national innovation system. By 
‘conventional’ we refer to an SI that is typical of non-socialist, market economies, and 
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essentially represent the EU core countries. An SI approach essentially allows us to map the 
complex interactions between a firm and its environment. The environment consists, firstly, of 
interactions between firms—especially between a firm and its network of customers and 
suppliers. Secondly, the environment involves broader factors shaping the behaviour of firms: 
the social, political and cultural context; the institutional and organisational framework; 
infrastructures; the processes which create and distribute scientific knowledge, and so on.  
 In addition to the firm and non-firm sectors – which account for the majority of 
innovative activities, knowledge, creation, dissemination, acquisition and utilisation are shaped 
by the actions (or inactions) of governments.  We use the concept of government in this section 
rather generically, but take it to include policy initiatives, motivated internally (at the country 
level) and externally (at the supra-national level). 
 The interactions between the various actors within a system are governed by institutions.  
Institutions are taken here to be of two types, informal and formal, and are generally understood 
as ‘sets of common habits, routines, established practises, rules, or laws that regulate the 
interaction between individuals and groups’ (Edquist and Johnson 1997). We take formal 
institutions to include the appropriate intellectual property rights regime, competition policy, the 
creation of technical standards, taxation, the establishment of incentives and subsidies for 
innovation, the funding of education, etc. Formal institutions are generally politically defined 
and legally binding rules, regulations and organisations. Indeed, the political and economic 
spheres are rarely independent, and this is all the more so where a high degree of central 
planning was undertaken, whether in developing countries that had implemented import 
substitution programmes, or in the former centrally planned economies. In general, the policy 
environment in which economic actors function has a high degree of interdependency between 
the economic and political spheres. 
To modify and develop informal institutions is a complex and slow process, particularly 
since they cannot be created simply by government fiat. It takes considerable effort to create 
informal networks of government agencies, suppliers, politicians, researchers, and once created, 
they have a low marginal cost of maintaining. For an outsider, the high costs of becoming 
familiar with, and integrating into, a new system may be prohibitive (Narula 2003).  For an 
insider, however, such membership comes with privileges which provide opportunities for rent 
generation.  Indeed, more recent work on informal institutions – which are notoriously difficult 
 9 
to quantify – point to the absence or inefficiency of institutions as a primary force inhibiting 
economic development (e.g., Rodrik 1999; Rodrik, et. al., 2004, Asiedu, 2006).  
*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
The former centrally planned economies among the NMS had much more national and 
closed economic systems, and a fundamentally different structure. Figure 2 shows the stylised 
version of pre-transition SI model. Prior to economic reforms, transition economies had a largely 
domestic innovation system where knowledge sources were determined primarily by domestic 
elements (Radosevic 1999, 2003). The technological development trajectory had been planned 
centrally in response to state-defined priorities. Likewise, domestic governmental organisations 
formulated domestic industrial policy, which in turn determined domestic industrial structure. 
National non-firm actors also defined the kinds of skills that the local labour force might possess; 
the kinds of technologies that these actors had appropriate expertise in; the kinds of technologies 
in which basic and applied research was conducted, and thereby, the industrial specialisation and 
competitive advantages of the firm sector. FDI was non-existent in those countries prior the 
transition era and any linkages to international sources were sporadic and state controlled. 
One of the primary conditions for EU membership was that economic systems of 
candidate countries needed to demonstrate a convergence towards the EU norm, and this has 
necessarily meant that NMS from the former centrally planned economies needed to demonstrate 
significant and tangible transition towards a more market based approach.  
Although some countries from the NMS responded successfully to radical changes in 
their industrial structure, the response of others has been less successful, and this broadly reflects 
the division between ‘advanced NMS’ and ’new NMS’. The primary difference between these 
two groups essentially reflected in a fundamentally different policy stance, where some countries 
maintained the basic principle of domestic firm-led industrialisation, while others moved to a 
MNE-led development strategy (Radosevic, 2006). Largely speaking the latter group modified 
their institutions and attempted to redesign their SIs around the ‘conventional’ market economy 
model, with varying degrees of success (Radosevic, 2006). This often reflected the extent to 
which there was a political imperative and a popular sentiment to distance themselves from the 
pre-transition dependence on the Soviet Union and realign their economies with the European 
Union.  In other words, the ability of different economies to transition reflected the strength of 
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the existing institutional arrangements and the political will to implement reforms (Newman 
2000). 
 There are two levels of government at work in every individual EU economy – formal 
institutions established by the national government, and those promulgated by EU law, and 
implemented through the European Commission. Bruzst and McDermott (2008) argue that the 
supranational institution-building required through EU efforts impinges greatly on national 
institution restructuring in post-communist states. It alters the supply side by making resources 
available to states to overcome interests groups and other entrenched actors’ inertia to change, 
while at the same time affecting demand for institutional change by empowering actors to 
participate in institutional building through the creation of linkages among domestic and foreign 
actors.  For instance, structural and cohesion funds in many instances are greater in terms of 
capital investment than the equivalent funds available from individual nation states of the NMS. 
EU-wide regulatory and competition policy, social and economic treaties and the like are binding 
and over-ride national law.  As we shall discuss in a later section, while this provides certain 
location advantages relative to non-member states, it also constrains policy options available to 
member states.   
 It is equally important to emphasise that the significance of non-domestic knowledge 
sources would also have changed quite dramatically, and this is not entirely because of the 
growing significance of MNE affiliates, or indeed FDI. Foreign knowledge sources and 
associated interdependencies with domestic actors take many forms, and the next section will 
discuss these in greater detail.  
 
The role of foreign knowledge in an innovation system SI model 
 
The sources of knowledge available in a typical ‘national’ system are a complex blend of 
domestic and foreign ones, as illustrated in a simplified (and stylised) framework depicted in 
Figure 3.  Learning processes are not just limited to intra-national interaction, but increasingly 
include international interaction. The pervasive role of MNEs in a globalising world, and their 
ability to utilise technological resources located elsewhere makes the use of a purely national 
systems of innovation approach rather limiting. 
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*** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In a domestic innovation system (such as in the case of the pre-transition CEE NMS), the 
path of technological development is determined primarily by domestic elements. The 
technological development trajectory is now driven largely by the changing demand of local 
customers, although in the pre-transition phase, this was driven by government-set targets. 
Likewise, domestic governmental organisations determine domestic industrial policy, which in 
turn determines domestic industrial structure. National non-firm sources of knowledge and 
national universities also determine the kinds of skills that engineers and scientists possess, and 
the kinds of technologies that these individuals have appropriate expertise in, the kinds of 
technologies in which basic and applied research is conducted in, and thereby the industrial 
specialisation and competitive advantages of the firm sector.  However, two decades after the 
transition process began, few – if any- such domestic systems still exist. Although this is not yet 
true in the NMS, in much of the core and cohesion countries MNE subsidiaries are sometimes so 
well embedded that they are regarded as part of the domestic environment. Nonetheless, the 
interaction between the domestic firm sector and foreign -owned firm sector varies considerably, 
either because the domestic sector is largely in different sectors, or because the two have evolved 
separately.  In the transition economies of NMS, FDI in the centrally planned era was non-
existent, and thus, the presence of foreign MNEs was a new phenomenon in the early post-
transition years. Local actors in many instances were reluctant to integrate MNEs into the system 
(Damijan, et.al., 2003; Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008).  
Universities and research institutes collaborate – both as organisations and as individual 
research groups – with other universities and research institutes in other countries 2 . The 
framework programmes of the European commission have played an important role in 
facilitating cross-border collaboration between economic actors within the EU (Narula 1999, 
2003), and this extends further to collaborations between public research organisations and firms 
(Arundel and Geuna 2004, Fontana et al 2006).   
                                                 
2
 A recent study (Thelwall and Zuccala 2008) shows that EU cooperation amongst universities still displays 
considerable divergence. The core EU countries continue to dominate inter-university EU collaboration, particularly 
the UK and Germany. The new EU countries are not yet integrated into the EU network, but some show strong 
regional links.  
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Figure 3 also includes a number of actors and arenas which are not directly associated 
with knowledge creation, but are nonetheless crucial in determining the efficiency with which 
knowledge is created, diffused and utilised in an innovation system. Perhaps most significantly 
for the purposes of this paper is the blend of EU level organisations, and national governments. 
EU law supersedes national regulatory frameworks. Among other things, competition policy and 
other forms of regulation are determined at the EU level. Likewise, prior to their EU membership 
countries have to accept the acquis communautaire, such that discrimination between domestic 
and foreign firms is no longer possible. Thus, this constrains and predetermines the use of EU 
and domestic funds. At a global level, supranational institutional level, countries are constrained 
by international treaties which either the EU or the individual country has acquiesced to. This 
includes WTO agreements such as TRIPS, TRIMS that also shape policy tools available to 
countries.   
 It is not the intention of this paper to analyse the broader implications of globalisation on 
knowledge systems in the EU. Our focus remains on the role of the MNE in innovation systems, 
and the next section discusses this in greater detail.  
 
To what extent does MNE activity benefit national systems? 
 
Much of the literature focuses on the subject of FDI and knowledge spillovers, for the 
purposes of this paper we take a broader perspective – that of the MNE and the linkages it 
creates. This allows us to account for a variety of other forms of interdependencies between and 
amongst firms, regions, countries and industries.  
*** FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
Linkages may be domestic (and thereby knowledge flows between the affiliate and other 
actors in the domestic economy) or they may be linkages between foreign sources of knowledge 
and domestic actors. We discuss this concept with the aid of Figure 4, which shows using a two-
country scenario and is based around a joint venture between an MNE and a domestic firm. If we 
rely on foreign direct investment (instead of the MNE) as the unit of analysis, we limit the 
discussion of linkages potential spillovers to the organisations linked with the block arrows, as 
these involve equity relationships. However, For instance, technology may be licensed or 
purchased by the MNE affiliate from unaffiliated public research organisations either abroad or 
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based locally. Indeed, a recent report indicates that the most innovative Bulgarian companies are 
primarily interested in selling their innovations to foreign firms, rather than using these 
innovations themselves (Innovation.bg Report 2006). A second set of linkages are active two-
way collaborations (indicated in figure 4 by the dashed lines) which may involve a large array of 
actors, both domestic and foreign. Such agreements represent a higher level of knowledge 
exchange, and may be undertaken with a variety of partners. In general, these non-equity 
linkages present considerable potential to increase knowledge flows and the potential 
technological competitiveness of domestic firms, as it creates important new sources of demand 
for commercially driven economic units engaged in R&D.   
The nature of the affiliate and the nature of their role within the MNE’s global portfolio 
of affiliates plays a significant role as well. Some affiliates may be passive in the sense that they 
may receive ready-made innovations from their parent firms. Thus, they do not establish these 
other types of linkages that enhance the indigenous innovation milieu. In other words, at one 
extreme, the affiliate may be operating in an enclave, utilising foreign suppliers and foreign 
collaborators that have been pre-specified by their parent firm.  
*** FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE *** 
The quality of the knowledge spillovers that derive from an investment are associated 
with the scope and competence level of the subsidiary, and these are co-determined by a variety 
of factors (see figure 5). These include MNE internal factors such as their internationalization 
strategy, the role of the new location in their global portfolio of subsidiaries, and the motivation 
of their investment, in addition to the available location-specific resources which can be used for 
that purpose (Benito et al 2003). High competence levels require complementary assets that are 
non-generic in nature and are often associated with agglomeration effects, clusters, and the 
presence of highly specialized skills. In other words, firms are constrained in their choice of 
location of high competence subsidiaries by local resource availability. For instance, R&D 
activities tend to be concentrated in few locations, because the appropriate specialized resources 
are associated with only few locations.  The embeddedness of firms is often a function of the 
duration of the MNEs’ presence, since firms tend to build incrementally. MNEs most often rely 
on location advantages that already exist in the host economy, and deepening of embeddedness 
occurs generally in response to improvements of the domestic technological capacity.  However, 
while the scope of activities undertaken by a subsidiary can be modified more or less instantly, 
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developing competence levels takes time. MNE investments in high value-added activities (often 
associated with high competence levels) have the tendency to be ‘sticky’. Firms demonstrate 
greater inertia when it comes to relocating R&D activities. This reflects the high costs and 
considerable time required to develop linkages with the innovation system (Narula 2002).   
Increasingly firms are engaged in rationalising their activities globally, so as to maximise 
the link with specific value adding activities and locations which have specific competitive and 
comparative advantages. This has led to a tendency amongst MNEs to ‘break-up’ their value 
chains and locate specific aspects in particular locations for purposes of maximum efficiency. As 
such, few locations host all parts of the value chain of one product for any given MNE, leading 
to an agglomeration of specific types of activities in particular locations. Prior to economic 
liberalization and EU integration, MNEs responded to investment opportunities primarily by 
establishing truncated miniature replicas of their facilities at home, although the extent to which 
they are truncated varied considerably between countries. The extent of truncation was 
determined by a number of factors, but by far the most important determinant of truncation - and 
thereby the scope of activities and competence level of the subsidiary - were associated with 
market size, capacity and capability of domestic industry (Dunning and Narula 2004). 
*** FIGURE 6*** 
One of the results of globalisation and the subsequent spatial redistribution of their value 
chains has been that many countries have seen a downgrading of their subsidiaries in terms of 
scope and competence, moving towards sales and marketing operations, although some – rather 
few – locations have seen a reduction in the scope, but an increase in the competence levels 
towards R&D units. Only very few have seen a shift towards strategic centres, or indeed 
maintained a multi-activity unit.   
As firms have used global production networks, this has by and large been to the benefit 
of the MNE, while most host countries with generic location advantages have seen a shift in 
scale, scope and competence. The competition for such activities between locations is 
considerable, and few locations provide the specialised and well-developed innovation systems 
that are needed. The benefit from subsidiaries varies considerably. A sales office or an assembly 
unit may have a high turnover, employ a large staff, but the technological spillovers will be 
relatively fewer than a manufacturing facility. Countries that are at an early stage of transition 
(and furthest away from convergence with the EU norm), with a very limited domestic sector and 
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a poorly defined innovation system are often host to single-activity subsidiaries, primarily in 
sales and marketing, as well as natural resource extraction. The most advanced economies with 
domestic technological capacity (such as the core EU members) have hosted the least truncated 
subsidiaries, often with R&D departments (see Majcen et al 2006 for a more in-depth discussion).   
Few MNEs still utilise miniature replicas when engaging in Greenfield investments. 
Rationalisation of activities within the single market has, in many cases, led to a downgrading of 
activities from truncated replica to single activity affiliates.  MNEs have taken advantage of the 
EU single market to rationalize production capacity in fewer locations to exploit economies of 
scale at the plant level, especially where local consumption patterns are not radically different to 
justify local capacity and where transportation costs are not prohibitive. This has meant that 
some miniature replicas have been downgraded to sales and marketing affiliates, which can be 
expected to have fewer opportunities for spillovers.   
To what extent the NMS will be able to benefit from an increase in the quality of MNE activity 
is still unclear. Although there will be some investment in new affiliates resulting in new 
(greenfield) subsidiaries that did not exist previously, there will also be a downgrading of 
subsidiaries (as discussed above). MNEs may divest their operations in response to better 
location advantages elsewhere in the EU (as Spain and Portugal are experiencing as their low 
cost advantages are eroded), or reduce the intensity of operations by lowering the level of 
competence and/or scope of their subsidiary, and shifting from truncated replicas to single 
activity affiliates.  There may also be a redistribution effect. That is, sectors that were dominated 
by domestic capital are transferred to foreign ownership, particularly where domestic capitalists 
have failed to improve their competitive advantages to compete effectively with foreign firms. 
Indeed, in many of the NMS, the share of foreign ownership in total capital stock is already 
typically much higher than in older EU member states, although with considerable variation 
across sectors (Narula and Bellak 2009). Garmel et al. (2008) predict that three-quarters of 
capital in the NMS will ultimately be acquired by investors from the core member states in the 
long run. In general, government incentives and subsidies are rarely pivotal in determining the 
scope and competence of MNEs (which normally imply greater potential for greater 
technological spillovers). We want to emphasise that from a growth and learning perspective, 
externalities only matter if they can be captured by other economic actors in the host economy. 
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For externalities to be optimally utilised there needs to be an appropriate match between the 
nature of potential externalities and the absorptive capacities of domestic firms. 
 
MNEs and new member states: linking MNE policies to innovation policies 
 
One must exercise caution in proposing policy recommendations to new member states as 
a general group, since there is considerable diversity in their economic structure. There are also 
path dependencies which reflect each individual member country’s socio-political and economic 
histories. In particular, member states that have transitioned from socialist, non-market systems 
demonstrate significant artefacts of the pre-transition era in their innovation systems, although 
this again varies considerably between countries. For similar reasons, the role of MNEs and other 
international economic actors can also be fundamentally different. On a more positive note, the 
criterion for EU membership has required convergence of economic and political institutions. 
The transition process has thus broadly resulted in some convergence in policies and trajectories 
of economic and structural change. Likewise, policies towards MNEs have also broadly speaking 
converged for the new member states.  However, the level of institutional convergence varies 
considerably, with Czech Republic arguably the closest to the EU core levels, and Bulgaria and 
Romania the furthest away.  The considerable levels of systemic inertia in some states has meant 
that insufficient effort has been made to embed them. Where MNEs have been embedded, they 
have done so as ‘domestic production substitution’, replacing previous state-owned firms in the 
industrial milieu of the host country through M&A of a former state-owned firm. In some cases 
the domestic linkages of the acquired firms have been maintained; but in most cases, a 
considerable percentage of these linkages have been substituted with those of the parent MNEs 
global network of affiliates and partners.  
Thus, the tendency in most cases has been to focus on FDI flows, but not the after-care or 
embedding aspect necessary for FDI-assisted development. While some countries – such as 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania have tended to consider FDI policies in 
tandem with industrial policy, others have focused on the two separately, or at best have made a 
loose connection between MNE activity and industrial restructuring and growth.  Few countries 
– even among the core EU economies – have seen the necessity of a three way link between 
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MNE policies, industrial policies and innovation policies. In our view, the three are inextricably 
linked.  
It is important to emphasise here the difference between advanced NMS and ‘New NMS’ 
countries, although in terms of attracting foreign investment in R&D, it seems clear that neither 
group of countries are likely to attract significant supply-side R&D. Few of these countries have 
developed their science and technology infrastructure to the level that they possess an absolute 
advantage in basic research for which MNEs will in rare circumstances seek to locate a stand-
alone, specialised affiliate R&D facility. Where this might occur in the advanced NMS, of which 
there is some activity in the Czech Republic and Hungary (OECD 2008). Indeed, there are only a 
few locations within the EU which have the appropriate science and technology infrastructure to 
achieve this. It is therefore most practical here to recommend that NMS focus on attracting and 
fostering demand-driven R&D activities by MNEs. These recommendations, therefore, do not 
differ greatly from those applicable to the embedding of FDI in general. As with all MNE-
embedding policies, the focus must at all times be centred on the deepening of existing MNE 
value adding activities, and the promotion of sequential investments that pull the MNE’s 
activities such that they are simultaneously deeply integrated with the MNE global structure and 
deeply embedded within the domestic innovation system. In other words, the goal remains to 
increase the strategic importance of the MNE’s domestic affiliate to the MNE headquarters, such 
that sequential investments are increasingly knowledge intensive.  Referring back to figure 6, the 
goal is to move subsidiaries from single-activity units and miniature replicas (quadrants A and B) 
towards quadrant C and D. This is no easy task.   
 
Reduce the emphasis on cost advantages. There is a tendency for many countries to measure 
their potential attractiveness to MNEs based on their basic infrastructure and relatively low cost 
labour. But these kinds of location advantages are generic, in the sense that they are widely 
available. Furthermore, MNEs do not locate their innovative activities based on cheap factor 
inputs, and where they do so, it tends to be of the sort that is footloose, such as clinical trials for 
pharmaceuticals (e.g., Kalotay and Fillipov 2008)  In addition, the last two decades of increasing 
liberalization, falling transportation and communication costs and investment in knowledge-
based activities in East Asia (by both domestic firms and MNEs)  has meant that the basic 
infrastructure and low wages are not a magnet for investment. It is axiomatic that as industrial 
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development takes place, the comparative advantage of these countries needs to shift away from 
low value adding activities to higher value adding activities, which are necessarily science-based, 
and the infrastructure (which forms an important quasi-public good) which is necessary to 
achieve this has not always been made available.  
Increase emphasis on specialised location-specific assets. It is only in those sectors where 
‘specialized’ location advantages associated with higher value adding exist can host countries 
benefit significantly from MNE activity in the long run. This requires a considerable amount of 
government interaction and investment into tangible and intangible infrastructure. As countries 
reach a threshold level of technological capabilities, governments need to provide more active 
support through macro-organizational policies. This implies developing and fostering specific 
industries and technological trajectories, such that the location advantages they offer are less 
‘generic’ and more specific, highly immobile and such that they encourage mobile investments 
to be locked into these assets. Many of the NMS have the basis for creating such science based 
location advantages. For instance, Poland has strengths in certain natural and life sciences, as 
does Hungary in electro-mechanical sectors. Of course, adapting to such challenges is not 
costless from four points of view. First, countries need considerable resources to invest in such 
vertical industrial policy actions. Many industrial policies to foster new sectors have failed 
because investment is often limited to building up only one part of the innovation system. For 
instance, Norway’s biotechnology initiative did not eventually maintain the initial momentum to 
encourage domestic and foreign firms to undertake R&D (which initially resulted in more than 
50 new biotech companies within 2 years in the Oslo area alone), since they failed to invest in 
PhD programmes in universities in the natural sciences. Second, introducing targeted 
programmes requires considerable political will and discipline, not just because picking one 
sector or industry requires others to be given less priority, but also because other industries will 
necessarily need to be ‘wound down’. Third, fostering new sectors requires major institutional 
change. Such radical systemic change requires resources and an effective period of transition 
given the inertia associated with informal institutions.  Fourth, developing a new sector needs to 
be undertaken in a 10-15 year time frame.  
 
Creating clusters around MNEs One of the challenges in creating embeddedness is associated 
with matching the industrial structure and comparative advantage of the region with the kinds of 
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FDI that are being attracted.  As highlighted in the previous section, benefits from FDI are 
maximised when the kinds of investment projects being attracted are matched with the potential 
clusters of domestic competitiveness into which the MNEs may be able to tap into.  
In many locations, including the US, and elsewhere in the EU, large projects are attracted 
with the intention of acting as a ‘seed’, such that a cluster can be built around them. Large 
incentives and subsidies are provided with the intention that not only will other foreign investors 
come to the same region, but there will be substantial linkages and growth of the domestic sector. 
The Toyota investment in St Petersburg is a case where sequential investments by additional 
investments have occurred because other Japanese firms followed in Toyota’s wake, but little or 
no attention was paid to the knock-on effects due to growth opportunities for domestic suppliers. 
Indeed, car firms operate in the same area, either jointly or independently. The St Petersburg-
Leningrad Oblast area has other large automotive sector firms and therefore considerable 
opportunities to link the skills and capabilities available – for instance - in the Kirov tractor and 
tank facility, but these opportunities were ignored. Policy makers focused entirely on the capital 
flows and employment, rather than on linkages.  Chobanova (2009) notes a similar passive 
approach in encouraging embeddedness of FDI in Bulgaria, and Romania, in contrast with the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. 
This can be contrasted with the success of Costa Rica in attracting a huge investment by 
the US MNE, Intel, but taken in the first instance to be the basis for building a sizable domestic 
industry of both foreign and domestic firms. The subsidies and incentives given to Intel were 
based more on the provision of a skilled and capable work force rather than sheer incentives (see 
Mortimore and Vergara 2006).  Intel’s decision to invest in Costa Rica in the mid 1990s had a 
huge impact on the Costa Rican economy, and represented the consolidation of the national 
strategy to diversify out of apparel and natural resources toward electronics. Furthermore, Intel’s 
investment produced a ripple effect throughout the economy in terms of related activities, such 
as software. Costa Rica chose to design and implement a new development strategy based on 
attracting FDI to upgrade into more technologically-sophisticated activities. A considerable 
amount of success was achieved in electronics, medical devices and logistics by way of selective 
interventions using innovative FDI promotion techniques. These were related to improving 
domestic capabilities to attract FDI, implementing an active and targeted FDI policy reflecting 
national developmental priorities, identifying the MNEs to be targeted and negotiating firm-level 
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packages, and designing and implementing industrial policies to deal with some of the problems 
which arise from the MNE activities, especially weak technology transfer and assimilation and 
limited productive linkages. Costa Rica stands out as an example of what can be achieved by 
coupling the correct policy framework --one that reflects the priorities of the national 
development strategy-- to a leader MNE’s global expansion strategy. The case of Intel in Costa 
Rica thus demonstrates how national policy goals and corporate strategy objectives can coincide, 
and the use of national policy to further industrialize by attracting the right kind of TNC 
activities in the right conditions (Mortimore and Vergara 2006, Mytelka and Barclay 2006). 
Attracting FDI with subsidies, but without attempting to maximise the linkages to the 
domestic economy often leads to a net negative sum game. The US state of Alabama gave $253 
million in subsidies and incentives to Daimler Benz in 1993, and it is only recently that it was 
judged that the benefits to the economy justified the expense. The NMS cannot afford to play the 
incentives and subsidies game without considering very carefully what the potential spillovers 
and linkages will be, and how these can be converted to actual benefits.  
 
A number of NMS – Czech Republic and Hungary in particular - attempted to encourage MNE 
embeddedness prior to accession by using broad policy measures: high tariffs and customs duties, 
rule of origin, local content, etc. However, upon accession, many MNEs – even in low-
technology area such as Food and Beverages – relocated activities, when such policy tools 
became redundant (Chobanova 2009). In other words, MNEs – when left to their own devices, 
and unrestricted by distortions in markets introduced by regulation, preferred to see economies of 
scale and scope in their existing activities within the core EU countries despite the low cost 
advantages the NMS offered (Chobanova 2009). Such import-substitution type policies were 
therefore only a short-term (and short-sighted) strategy, as EU and WTO law requires MNEs to 
receive national treatment.  
 
‘Help’ MNEs create linkages It is fashionable amongst policy makers and consultants to 
suggest that attracting MNE affiliates associated with global production chains is an important 
goal. Unfortunately, this is a fallacy, since such affiliates are rarely embedded in the local 
economy, but deeply embedded into the MNE.  It is generally the case that the most embedded 
affiliates tend to be those that have a higher degree of autonomy within the MNE structure, and 
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are able to make local decisions about the nature and extent of their domestic linkages 
(Castellani and Zanfei 2006). Affiliates that are responsive to, and dependent upon, the parent 
MNE to make their decision are less embedded, partly because headquarters has incomplete 
information on local options, and rarely has a vested interest in developing new suppliers. In rare 
cases, a subsidiary may be deeply embedded in the local milieu as well as deeply integrated into 
the MNE network, but this implies the case of an acquisition of a domestic competitor with a 
historical local embeddedness (so that the MNE acquires the ready-made linkages as part of the 
merger) As Narula and Marin (2004) show for the case of Argentina, MNEs acquired the most 
technologically competitive of their domestic rivals during the structural adjustment programme.  
It may also imply a very strategically important subsidiary, often also a result of a long-term and 
sustained investment. In both cases, such dual integration – while highly desirable by 
governments – is rarely achieved in most investments. Indeed, as Chobanova (2009) shows that 
even for the Food and Beverage industry where skills and knowledge content is fairly low, the 
NMS were unable to sustain domestic production by MNEs even where they acquired existing 
firms with proven and fairly well-developed supply chains.  Creating local suppliers to MNE 
networks is not something that happens overnight, and their efficiency is not something that is to 
be measured solely in terms of cost, but in terms of reliability and flexibility, and these measures 
should be evaluated relative to global rather than EU levels.  MNEs cannot sustain higher 
production costs due to poor quality, unless cheaper and more reliable local suppliers emerge.  
The competitiveness of local suppliers need to be gauged on a EU-wide, rather than local scale.  
The Czech Republic and Hungary, invested considerably in creating linkages between MNEs 
and domestic firms in the food industry, as well as in upgrading their innovation systems. 
Nonetheless, the competition with other locations in the EU was too strong for them to survive 
after accession (Chobanova 2009). 
As MNE increasingly seek to rationalize their activities (as is the case with industries that 
operate global production networks), decisions about local linkages are not always made at the 
subsidiary level, but at the headquarters level, by comparing the various options available to the 
MNE globally. Thus governments need to create incentives for the MNE to consider local 
partners, and not expect these to happen ‘naturally’. Since EU member states cannot discriminate 
by nationality of ownership, in the circumstances where domestic firms are not present, linkages 
between foreign affiliates and other foreign firms (but located and engaged in economic activity 
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in the same host location) may represent the sole available mode of industrial upgrading and 
capability development in the NMS. Thus policies to upgrade reliability and quality in existing 
domestic firms are important.  In most transition countries there are often existing firms which, 
while in the appropriate industry, do not currently meet the quality and reliability requirements 
of the MNE. This is often associated with poor management, and agencies such as Enterprise 
Ireland offer a comprehensive range of services to assist clients to develop their business strategy, 
enhance their skills and http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/Grow/Competitiveness/Build_new_skills.htmreduce costs3. This service is provided 
under strict guidelines, and is normally based on a cost-sharing approach. It also tends to provide 
funding only for feasibility studies, market research, mentor network service, trade fair 
participation and training support. In order to be eligible firms must be a manufacturing or 
internationally traded services SME employing 10-249 people.  
MNEs seek well-established existing location advantages, and the initial scale of entry 
will tend to be small both in size and scope, with competence levels that match the existing 
capacity of the innovation system. This, as we have discussed is often modest compared to other 
core EU economies. MNEs also tend to display a strong inertia towards maintaining their R&D 
activities in a few locations, and this means that the benefits of setting up a new research facility 
must demonstrate substantial advantages that offset the costs of ‘exit’ from another location. 
MNEs that arrive in a new location also have entry costs in terms of becoming familiar with new 
institutions, in order to become ‘club members’ of the ‘innovation system, and this represents a 
substantial cost for firms. Programmes like the EU’s Twinning programme are also in existence 
for individual countries, where new entrants are ‘introduced’ to potential partners. For instance, 
Czechinvest maintains a database of competences and potential suppliers, and introduces 
potential suppliers to the foreign investor as part of the attraction and aftercare service they 
provide. The Czech Supplier Development Programme has been run by CzechInvest since 1999. 
The objective is to intensify and strengthen contacts between domestic suppliers and 
multinational manufacturers already operating in the Czech Republic or planning to invest here. 
The main goal of the programme is to increase the competitiveness of Czech suppliers so that 
                                                 
3
 See Enterprise Ireland website; http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/Grow/ 
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they may become partners for multinational companies, and also to help multinational 
manufacturers find new partners from the ranks of Czech suppliers4. 
There is an important ‘catch-22’ association in the implementation of industrial and 
innovation policy. MNEs establish and expand affiliates based on existing opportunities to link 
up with the innovation system. However, countries sometimes rely on MNEs to reinvigorate 
their innovation system and boost growth through establishing linkages. MNE activity per se 
does not provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector exists which has the 
necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities from MNE activity. Yet, as there 
are only very few viable domestic firms left in some industries in these countries, this possibility 
of growth may be limited. 
 
Improve opportunities for start-up and SMEs. Many EU member states (this applies to the 
EU core members as well) have poorly developed policies for SMEs and start-ups, with a focus 
on large firms. More than 70% of R&D in the Netherlands, Finland, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Sweden, Germany, and France, is done by large firms (OECD 2008). This applies equally to 
MNEs – the focus is often on larger MNEs, rather than on smaller MNEs. However, smaller 
MNEs have the advantage of not possessing a large intra-MNE network, and are more likely to 
embed locally.  
In new industries especially, no dominant large firms may exist, and the emphasis must 
be on establishing start-ups. LIUP in Singapore runs a Startup Enterprise Development Scheme 
(SEEDS). Start-ups can apply for SEEDS equity financing when they are in their early stages. 
Every dollar raised by a start-up from third-party investors is matched up to a maximum5.  In 
high-tech (and therefore more risky) sectors, Singapore’s enterprise Development Board also 
provides risk sharing in technology-based ventures with investors via the Enterprise Investment 
Incentive (Technopreneur) Scheme6. This scheme gives qualifying firms loss insurance for their 
investments, and is not limited only to domestic firms, although all firms need to be incorporated 
in Singapore. In addition, Singapore encourages inventors to patent inventions and 
                                                 
4
 Czechinvest maintains a database with over 2000 Czech manufacturers/potential suppliers registered.. 
http://www.czechinvest.org/en/czech-suppliers 
5
 http://www.edb.gov.sg/edb/sg/en_uk/index/our_services/startups/financing/startup_enterprise.html 
6
 http://www.edb.gov.sg/edb/sg/en_uk/index/our_services/startups/financing/enterprise_investment.html 
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commercialise their inventions. This scheme helps cover some of the costs of filing patent 
applications, such as professional and official fees and other related charges of patent filing. 
Improving human resources capabilities in line with demand. The human resource 
capabilities are important at two levels. On the first level the emphasis is on human resource 
capabilities generic to the innovation system. Although traditionally this has implied university 
level graduates, this is not always the case. Innovation requires a broad range of qualifications, 
including technicians and skilled workers.  It is important that tertiary education institutions 
focus on all of these different levels, and that programmes developed in the appropriate 
industries and specialisations for which demand exists, as well as in generic subjects and areas. 
In Singapore, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Economic Development Board and the 
Council for Professional and Technical Education work closely together to monitor future skills 
needs, drawing on inputs from foreign and local investors as well as from education and training 
institutions. This information is matched against national policy objectives and used to build 
targets for various components of universities, polytechnics, schools and the Institute for 
Technical Education (UNCTAD 2005). These types of skills more generally meet the needs of 
the economy, and also include building up educational skills of teachers, trainers and university 
lecturers, in addition to those needed to run basic infrastructure projects such as electrical power 
generation, construction, and the like. In addition, business infrastructure education is necessary, 
and investments in developing more generic skills such as accounting, actuarial sciences, etc, are 
needed.  
There are specific skills needed by particular domestic and foreign firms. Universities and 
polytechnics can be encouraged to work with specific MNEs to provide specific training in two 
ways. First, there are specific on-the-job training programmes to develop skills in particular areas 
for existing employees. These require careful collaboration between firms and tertiary 
institutions. A number of FDI subsidies are normally tied in to the foreign investor providing 
some level of specialised training to potential employees which are co-financed by the 
government. This is done through two means. First, by providing a training subsidy per 
employee to each company (for instance, 35% of training costs up to a maximum limit of $500 
for up to 100 employees per year for specialist training, 20% for general training). Specialist 
training refers to training which cannot easily be used by employees if they change jobs, because 
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of its specific nature to the MNE. This results in an increase in productivity for the MNE, and at 
the same time raises the overall quality of human capital in the country.  
MNEs sometimes seek specialist training programmes in institutions of higher learning to 
promote the proper training of potential employees, but this is largely the initiative of the firms 
in question, and is a model that is only viable for large MNEs which have special needs, and can 
afford to do so (Chobanova 2009). There are several cases where MNEs have financed special 
courses (particularly in management) for their staff at local universities, but these are again 
sporadic and at the expense of the MNE.  
In many countries, the government requires that every firm provides a certain number of 
internships in technical positions as part of the educational curriculum of technical schools. This 
raises the quality of the educational institutions, and at the same time acting as a mechanism for 
the firm to identify young potential employees. Such schemes currently exist, and are entirely 
dependent on the goodwill of foreign affiliates. In other countries, this is formally integrated 
through organisation such as South Carolina’s (US) CATT which provides a link between 
employers and technical institutions. The Center for Accelerated Technology Training (CATT) is 
a programme subsidised by the US state of South Carolina, and helps investors to find 
appropriately qualified workers, and also provides some level of specific skills-training for blue-
collar employees. It focuses on the training needs of new and existing business and industry in 
South Carolina. CATT's services are provided through state tax dollars at minimal or no cost to 
the qualifying client. CATT specializes in custom-designed, short- and long-term, company-
specific training for industries seeking to locate or expand in South Carolina. CATT provides 
recruiting, assessment, training development, and management and implementation services to 
customers who are creating new jobs with competitive wages and benefits. These services are 
provided through state funds at minimal or no cost and training is developed to meet specific 
requirements of each customer. Training may be delivered through pre-employment or on the job 
activities dependent on the time frames and individual needs of the customer7. 
 
Building Research Capacities in the Public Sector. There are two aspects to building research 
capacity in the public sector. First, there are investments in supply-side R&D generation. This 
includes investments in long-term research projects in specific areas – as is the case with national 
                                                 
7
 Source: http://www.cattsc.com/ 
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laboratories, academy of sciences, etc.  These generate outputs such as academic publications, 
patents, etc, which acts as an important source of knowledge inputs for larger research 
establishments by MNEs and domestic firms.  Public research institutes are also necessary to 
provide technical services for testing and as a consultancy service to firms as part of the 
infrastructure for metrology, standards, testing and quality control. 
 Second, there are demand-driven public institutes which actively work in particular sectors 
whose primary purpose is to develop specific innovations to meet the need of a sector or group 
of firms, and are a quasi-public good. The institute sector in  Norway consists of approximately 
15 technological research institutes and 30 social research institutes, and reflects the various 
stages of Norwegian industrial policy over the post world war II years. They can be classified 
into 4 main groups. First, there are the ‘collective’ industry–specific research institutes. These 
are based around particular sectoral interests. For instance, the pulp and paper industry sponsors 
the pulp and paper institute. Second, there are the ‘modernisation’ institutes which were 
established as a part of the policy strategy to upgrade and develop particular industries which 
were deemed as essential to create a modern industrial sector, beginning in the 1950s. The third 
group are the regional institutes which are linked to local university-level colleges with the 
intention of developing and supporting local industry in the various regions of Norway, and 
linking them to the regional tertiary level colleges. The fourth group of institutes evolved in 
response to new targeted industries (in particular petroleum, and later electronics), but over time 
have evolved and merged, and are now merged into one organisation- SINTEF. The SINTEF 
group has evolved to what is arguably one of the largest R&D laboratories in Northern Europe, 
with almost 2000 employees. It is by far the largest R&D performer in Norway. It undertakes 
roughly 60% of the R&D outsourced by Norwegian industry. SINTEF is organised 8 research 
areas, and also controls 4 stock research companies. The primary rationale for the very strong, 
centralised (and concentrated) nature of the institute sector in Norway has been to create 
economies of scale and scope in research. 
 
Policy tools to promote R&D policy options such as the use of intellectual property rights 
policies and competition policies available to other countries outside the EU are not available to 
NMS, and as such we will not discuss them. Other options, such as R&D tax credits lead to 
greater innovation activities by firms that already engage in R&D activities. They do not 
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necessarily promote the increased R&D by firms that do not engage in R&D in the first place. 
Furthermore, the cost of such programmes is often prohibitive if positive and tangible results are 
to be achieved. Indeed, a recent study by Harris et al (2008) emphasise that in disadvantaged 
regions of the EU R&D substantial increases in the tax credit would be needed, at a level that 
might negate the benefit of such tax credits. This is exacerbated by the competition in terms of 
tax credits by different countries.  Competition policy is another area that countries such as 
China have used to great effect, by using policies to offering large MNEs  oligopolistic markets 
on the condition that knowledge-intensive and R&D activities are undertaken locally, whether 
independently, or in conjunction with domestic firms (Liang 2007). Apart from the fact that it 
contravenes EU competition policy as well as WTO rules (they are in effect a performance 
requirement), China has the added advantage of its large market size to use as a bargaining tool.   
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Figure 1 The conventional model of an innovation system  
 
Source Narula and Jormanainen 2008 
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Figure 2 The pre-transition model of innovation systems in centrally planned 
countries
 
Source Narula and Jormanainen 2008 
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Figure 3: The growing non-national interdependencies on shaping knowledge and innovation in the EU 
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Figure 5: determinants of the competence, scope and scale of  a foreign 
affiliate 
Source Narula and Bellak (2009) 
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Source: Benito et al 2003 
Figure 6 Different types of subsidiaries, and their relationship to scope and competence 
levels. 
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